A Modern Look at Implied Covenants to Explore, Develop, and Market Under Mineral Leases [reprint, first published 1976] by Martin, Patrick H.
Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal
Volume 3 | Number 2
A Collection of Archived Works from the Deans of Oil and Gas Law
July 2017
A Modern Look at Implied Covenants to Explore,
Develop, and Market Under Mineral Leases
[reprint, first published 1976]
Patrick H. Martin
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, and the Oil,
Gas, and Mineral Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact darinfox@ou.edu.
Recommended Citation
Patrick H. Martin, A Modern Look at Implied Covenants to Explore, Develop, and Market Under Mineral Leases [reprint, first published
1976], 3 Oil & Gas, Nat. Resources & Energy J. 401 (2017),
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss2/5
 
401 
 
ONE J 
Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal 
VOLUME 3                                                                                      NUMBER 2 
 
A MODERN LOOK AT IMPLIED COVENANTS 
TO EXPLORE, DEVELOP, AND MARKET 
UNDER MINERAL LEASES* 
[reprint, first published 1976] 
PATRICK H. MARTIN 
University of Tulsa, College of Law 
Tulsa, Oklahoma 
Introduction 
It has now been twenty years since Professor Charles Meyers published 
his article which initiated an often-heated dispute over whether there is an 
implied covenant of further exploration.1 Since that debate, relatively little 
controversy has been generated in the law of implied covenants.2 This is 
unfortunate for it is a matter of some significance to the nation. In light of 
recent developments affecting the petroleum industry, it is time for a 
fundamental reexamination of certain aspects of implied covenant law. The 
purpose of this discussion is to begin such a reexamination. 
                                                                                                                 
 * This article was originally published in the Twenty-seventh Annual Institute on Oil 
and Gas Law and Taxation. See Partrick H. Martin, A Modern Look at Implied Covenants to 
Explore, Develop, and Market Under Mineral Leases, 27 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 
177 (1976).  Reprinted with permission.  Copyright 1976 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., 
a LexisNexis company. All rights reserved. 
 1. Meyers, “The Implied Covenant of Further Exploration,” 34 Texas L. Rev. 553 
(1956). On the dispute, see the materials cited in N. 39 infra. 
 2. This should be qualified by reference to current debate with respect to the implied 
covenant against drainage. See the materials in N. 12 infra. 
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Briefly stated, my suggestion is that the corporate lessee today has 
responsibilities in national energy development and environmental 
protection that often require it to consider the long-term consequences of its 
actions without regard to short-term profit, that our concept of the “prudent 
operator” should be modified to give due regard to the modern role of the 
lessee, and that courts should less readily find breach of implied covenant 
duties in order that implied covenant law not hinder lessees in fulfilling 
their national responsibilities. The prudent operator standard, a judicially 
fashioned rule, is sufficiently flexible to accommodate change. For those 
who might find a modified approach to implied covenant law offensive 
because of the rule of stare decisis or because lessors have had expectations 
created by existing case law, I offer Sir Edward Coke’s statement: “How 
long soever it hath continued, if it be against reason, it is of no force in 
law.”3 
The Implied Covenants 
There is an extensive literature on the subject of implied covenant law 
that has been written by a number of very able authorities. One cannot 
begin to consider the subject seriously without reference to the writings of 
Merrill,4 Williams and Meyers,5 Summers,6 Brown,7 and Walker8 and 
others who have dealt with particular aspects of the subject. The works of 
these writers go into the large body of case law in far greater detail than the 
scope of the present discussion permits, and it should be understood that I 
am not attempting to duplicate their treatment of these numerous cases.9 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Coke on Littleton, First Institute § 80. 
 4. Merrill, Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases (2d ed. 1940 and 1964 Supp.). 
 5. Williams and Meyers, Oil and Gas Law §§ 801–878. Additional articles by 
Professor Meyers are listed separately in N. 39 infra. 
 6. Summers, Oil and Gas §§ 395–416. 
 7. Brown, The Law of Oil and Gas Leases (2d ed. rev. 1973). 
 8. Walker, “The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in 
Texas,” 11 Texas L. Rev. 399 (1933). 
 9. The court observed in Clayton v. Atlantic Refining Co., 150 F. Supp. 9, 13, 7 O. & 
G.R. 1426 (D.N.M. 1957), that “the law dealing with the implied covenant to drill additional 
wells is monumental in volume, and the Federal and State Reports from all oil and gas 
producing jurisdictions are replete with cases on the question.” 
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Although the authorities and the cases have enumerated many implied 
covenants in mineral leases under various headings, the implied covenants 
will be treated here as being in six categories:10  
(1) The implied covenant to drill an initial exploratory well; 
(2) The implied covenant to protect against drainage; 
(3) The implied covenant to use reasonable care in producing the 
minerals; 
(4) The implied covenant of reasonable development; 
(5) The implied covenant of further exploration; and 
(6) The implied covenant to market the product. 
The first three categories will not be included in this paper. The implied 
covenant to drill an initial well is no longer of significance because the 
typical lease today terminates automatically if a well is not drilled or 
excused by delay rentals within a fixed period.11 The implied covenant to 
protect against drainage involves special considerations that are of limited 
pertinency to the present discussion and warrant separate treatment.12 The 
implied covenant to use reasonable care in producing the minerals often 
concerns questions of negligence which may be treated under the law of 
torts,13 and the covenant does not involve the same policy considerations as 
the latter three implied covenants. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 10. This classification essentially follows that of Williams and Meyers, N. 5 supra at § 
804. For other classifications, see Merrill, N. 4 supra, § 4; Summers, N. 6 supra, § 395; 
Brown, N. 7 supra, § 16.02 at 16-6; and Walker, N. 8 supra at 401. 
 11. See Moses, “The Evolution and Development of the Oil and Gas Lease,” 2d Oil & 
Gas Inst. 1 (Matthew Bender 1951). 
 12. See Seed, “The Implied Covenant in Oil and Gas Leases to Refrain from Depletory 
Acts,” 3 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 508 (1956); Hardy, “Drainage of Oil and Gas from Adjoining 
Tracts—A Further Development,” 6 Nat. Res. J. 45 (1966); Brooks, “Liability of an Oil and 
Gas Lessee for Causing Drainage: A Standard for Texas,” 51 Texas L. Rev. 546 (1973); 
Shell Oil Co. v. Stansbury, 401 S.W.2d 623, 25 O. & G.R. 559 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), error 
ref’d, n.r.e., 410 S.W.2d 187, 25 O. & G.R. 578 (Tex. 1967); Shell Oil Co. v. James, 257 
So.2d 488, 40 O. & G.R. 215 (Miss. 1971); Williams v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 432 
F.2d 165, 38 O. & G.R. 212 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 402 U.S. 934 (1971); Carter Oil 
Co. v. Dees, 340 Ill. App. 449, 92 N.E.2d 519 (1950). 
 13. See Brown, “Oil and Gas Lease—Implied Covenant to Use Due Care,” 19 Texas L. 
Rev. 80 (1940), and Brown, N. 7 supra, § 16.02 at 16-67. 
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The Implied Covenant of Reasonable Development 
The implied covenant of reasonable development arises after the drilling 
of an initial producing well14 and applies in the primary term of the lease as 
well as the secondary.15 It is concerned with additional development in 
known producing formations,16 although some writers17 and jurisdictions18 
would consider the question of drilling in unproven formations under this 
same general heading. 
The principle of reasonable development is easily stated and similar 
terminology is employed in most jurisdictions. As stated in the case of 
Temple v. Continental Oil,19 which will be examined in some detail, “It is 
well settled that where the existence of oil in paying quantities is made 
apparent . . . it is the duty of the lessee to continue the development of the 
property and to put down as many wells as may be reasonably necessary to 
secure the oil for the common advantage of both the lessor and lessee.”20 
The standard applied to determine whether the lessee has fulfilled the 
implied covenant is also virtually the same in almost all jurisdictions. It is 
the prudent operator standard that is stated in the Temple case as follows: 
“[W]hat is required of a lessee, under the implied covenant to 
develop an oil and gas lease, is reasonable diligence in doing 
what would be expected of an operator of ordinary prudence, in 
the furtherance of the interests of both lessor and lessee. Under 
this rule neither the lessor nor the lessee of an oil and gas lease is 
the sole judge of what constitutes prudent development of the 
tract.”21 [Emphasis in original, citations omitted.] 
Since the implied covenant of reasonable development and the test for 
compliance with it are so well established, one might conclude that it 
should present few problems as a guide for lessees and for courts. 
                                                                                                                 
 14. The payment of a cash sum or an annual rental to delay drilling precludes an implied 
development covenant. State ex rel. Comm’rs of Land Office v. Couch, 298 P.2d 452, 6 O. 
& G.R. 346 (Okla. 1956). 
 15. Berry v. Wondra, 173 Kan. 273, 246 P.2d 282, 1 O. & G.R. 1099 (1952). 
 16. Williams and Meyers, N. 5 supra, § 831. 
 17. Merrill, N. 4 supra, Ch. III (“The Implied Covenant to Drill Additional Wells”); 
Hemingway, Oil and Gas § 8.3 (1971). 
 18. Oklahoma, for example, as discussed infra p. 183 and N. 29. 
 19. 182 Kan. 213, 320 P.2d 1039, 8 O. & G.R. 717, on motion for reh’g 183 Kan. 471, 
328 P.2d 358, 9 O. & G.R. 642 (958). 
 20. 8 O. & G.R. at 736. 
 21. 8 O. & G.R. at 724. 
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Unfortunately this is not so, for each case is “governed by its own facts 
within the principle of equitable justice.”22 The facts will, of course, be 
different for each case, and notions of what constitutes equitable justice 
vary widely. However, a number of common factors are generally 
considered in determining whether there has been reasonable development 
of the lease. A recent Kansas decision23 has listed the factors as follows: 
(1) The quantity of oil and gas capable of being produced as 
indicated by prior exploration and development; 
(2) The local market and demand therefor; 
(3) The extent and results of the operations, if any, on adjacent 
lands; 
(4) The character of the natural reservoir—whether such as to permit 
the drainage of a large area of each well; 
(5) The usages of the business; 
(6) The cost of drilling, equipment, and operation of wells; 
(7) Cost of transportation, cost of storage, and the prevailing price; 
and 
(8) General market conditions as influenced by supply and demand 
or by regulation of production through governmental agencies. 
In addition, some cases give weight to evidence of the willingness of 
another operator to drill on the tract in question,24 the attitude of the lessee 
toward further development,25 and the elapsed time since drilling operations 
were last conducted.26 The possibility of profitable production has been of 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Crocker v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 419 P.2d 265, 266, 25 O. & G.R. 681 (Okla. 
1965). 
 23. Sanders v. Birmingham, 214 Kan. 769, 522 P.2d 959, 966, 50 O. & G.R. 468 (Kan. 
1974). For an earlier but similar listing, see Ramsey Petroleum Corp. v. Davis, 184 Okla. 
155, 85 P.2d 427, 430 (1938), or Spiller v. Massey & Moore, 406 P.2d 467, 472, 23 O. & 
G.R. 767 (Okla. 1965). See also, Williams and Meyers, N. 5 supra, § 833, and Merrill, N. 4 
supra, § 123. 
 24. Berry v. Wondra, N. 15 supra. Amerada Petroleum Co. v. Doering, 93 F.2d 540 (5th 
Cir. 1937); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Romero, 194 F.2d 383, 1 O. & G.R. 358 (5th Cir. 
1952) (a further exploration case). 
 25. McMahan v. Boggess, 302 S.W.2d 592, 7 O. & G.R. 1396 (Ky. 1957); Vickers v. 
Vining, 452 P.2d 798, 32 O. & G.R. 678 (Okla. 1969). 
 26. Texas Consolidated Oils v. Vann, 208 Okla. 673, 258 P.2d 679, 680, 2 O. & G.R. 
1335 (1953) (“A lapse of time is sufficient to show unreasonable delay, in a proper case.”); 
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primary consideration in the implied covenant of reasonable development, 
and all of the above factors except the last two have significance because 
they assist in determining whether drilling may be profitable to lessor and 
lessee. That profit is of paramount importance is indicated in Williams and 
Meyers’ statement that “if the lessee can make a profit by drilling additional 
wells, he should be required to do so . . . .”27 
Ordinarily the burden of proof to establish a breach of the implied 
covenant of reasonable development is on the lessor, and this burden may 
be satisfied by showing there is a reasonable expectation that additional 
development will be profitable.28 However, in Oklahoma, the passage of an 
unreasonable length of time will result in a shifting of the burden of proof 
from the lessor to the lessee which must establish that there has been 
reasonable development of the lease.29 
When a breach of the implied covenant of reasonable development has 
been established, several remedies may be granted by the court, either 
singly or in combination. Damages may be awarded, the court may order 
cancellation of the undeveloped portion of the lease, or a conditional decree 
may be given that the undeveloped portion of the lease will be cancelled if 
                                                                                                                 
Fontenot v. Austral Oil Exploration Co., 168 F. Supp. 36, 10 O. & G.R. 764 (W.D. La. 
1958); Lake v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 2 Ohio App. 2d 227, 207 N.E. 2d 659, 22 O. & G.R. 625 
(1965). 
 27. N. 5 supra, § 815 at 72. Merrill similarly states that the lessee “should engage in 
further development where the indications point to profit.” N. 4 supra, § 122 at 283. 
 28. See the cases cited in Brown, N. 7 supra, § 16.03(5) at n. 48. Several recent cases of 
interest in which the lessors were unable to meet this burden are Sanders v. Birmingham, N. 
23 supra, and Brixey v. Union Oil Co., 283 F. Supp. 353, 28 O. & G.R. 541 (W.D. Ark. 
1968). On satisfying the lessor’s burden, see N. 82 infra. 
 29. Doss Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co. 192 Okla. 359, 137 P.2d 934 (1943); Skelly Oil 
Co. v. Boles, 193 Okla. 308, 142 P.2d 969 (1943); Wolfson Oil Co. v. Gill, 309 P.2d 282, 7 
O. & G.R. 300 (Okla. 1957); Crocker v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., N. 22 supra. Mere 
lapse of time alone without further development will not result in a breach of the implied 
covenant. Union Oil Co. of California v. Jackson, 489 P.2d 1073, 39 O. & G.R. 645 (Okla. 
1971). See also Miller, “The Element of Time in Relation to Breach of the Implied Covenant 
to Further Development in Oklahoma,” 25 Okla. B. A. J. 765 (1954). The dilemma of the 
Oklahoma lessee is that in establishing there is no likelihood of commercial production from 
the portion of the lease in question it must then explain why it wishes to retain the 
unproductive portion of the lease. It is then impaled on the policy against speculation. Coal 
Oil & Gas Co. v. Styron, 303 P.2d 965, 6 O. & G.R. 827 (Okla. 1956); Carter v. United 
States Smelting, Refining & Min. Co., 485 P.2d 748, 39 O. & G.R. 295 (Okla. 1971); 
Vickers v. Vining, N. 25 supra; Conn, “Trends in the Application of the Implied Covenant 
of Further Development,” 12 Okla. L. Rev. 470, 489 (1959). The author acknowledges the 
research assistance of Mr. James Gillett on Oklahoma law on further development. 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss2/5
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drilling thereon is not commenced by a set date.30 There is generally no loss 
of mineral in a breach of the implied covenant of reasonable development, 
so the only damage, if any,31 to the lessor is the loss of interest he might 
have earned on the royalty on the delayed production. Nevertheless, when a 
court does award damages, it is in the amount of the royalty that would 
have been paid, not the interest that the royalty would have earned.32 
Conditional cancellation appears to be the favored remedy.33 
A case that well illustrates an application of the implied covenant of 
reasonable development is the case mentioned previously, Temple v. 
Continental Oil Co.34 Between 1936 and 1953, defendants had drilled seven 
wells on a lease covering a quarter section. At the time of filing of the suit 
in late 1955, defendants had produced almost a million barrels of oil and 
had released ten acres which were then turned over to another operator. 
Plaintiffs sought cancellation of the lease as to ten acres in the northeast 
corner of the leasehold on the ground that an operator of ordinary prudence 
would have drilled a well on this ten-acre tract in the furtherance of the 
interests of both lessors and lessees. The trial court accepted plaintiffs’ 
expert witnesses’ testimony that the ten-acre tract had “good possibilities of 
producing oil commercially” and rejected the defendants’ experts’ 
testimony that water encroachment had reduced the amount of producing 
                                                                                                                 
 30. See Christie, Mitchell & Mitchell Co. v. Howell, 359 S.W.2d 658, 17 O. & G.R. 420 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1962), error ref’d, n.r.e.; Vickers v. Vining, 452 P.2d 798, 32 O. & G.R. 
678 (Okla. 1969); Elliott v. Pure Oil Co. 139 N.E.2d 295, 7 O. & G.R. 228 (Ill. 1956); Skelly 
Oil Co. v. Scoggins, 231 Ark. 257, 329 S.W.2d 424, 12 O. & G.R. 163 (1959); LeBlanc, 
“Cancellation Decrees—Vertical and Horizontal Cancellation,” 17th Ann. Inst. on Min. L. 
154 (L.S.U. 1970); Krieg, “Lease Termination for Breach of the Implied Obligations of the 
Lessee,” 3 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 697 (1957). 
 31. The mineral may increase in value substantially if production is delayed. When this 
increase in value is greater than the interest the lessor could have earned on the royalty had 
the mineral been produced earlier, the lessor has suffered no loss. To illustrate this, consider 
the lessor who received a 37.5-cent royalty on a barrel of oil produced and sold for $3 in 
1967. Invested at 8 percent, its total value would be 64.3 cents in 1974. Had the oil been 
produced at $11.50 in 1974, the royalty would have been $1.44 or almost 80 cents more in 
value over time. Recognizing the possibility of an increase in the value of the petroleum, at 
least one court has required an award of damages to the lessor yet has still permitted him to 
benefit from any increase in value that may result from the delay of production. See Cotiga 
Development Co. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 147 W. Va. 484, 128 S.E.2d 626, 17 O. & G.R. 
583 (1962). It seems inappropriate to award a party damages because he has been wronged 
and then allow him the benefit of the supposed wrong. 
 32. Ibid., reversing a trial court award of damages under the interest rule. 
 33. William and Meyers, N. 5 supra, § 834; Krieg, N. 30 supra at 709–710. 
 34. N. 19 supra. 
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formation to a point where little or no recoverable oil remained under the 
tract. The Kansas Supreme Court accepted as fact that eventually the 
defendants’ existing well would produce all the recoverable oil but held that 
the lessors’ successors were “entitled to the benefit of oil produced from the 
lease at the time it should be produced and not at some remote period of 
time in the future.”35 Defendants were given four months in which to com-
mence the drilling of a well or have the lease cancelled as to the ten acres. 
It should be mentioned that there are several matters that are related to 
the implied covenant of reasonable development that have yet to be the 
subject of much litigation, but which may assume increased importance 
with the expansion of governmental regulation of the petroleum industry 
and the decline in production from older fields. Most important of these are 
the questions of the extent of the obligations of lessees to represent lessors 
in administrative proceedings36 and to effect unitization and utilize 
secondary recovery methods.37 
The Implied Covenant of Further Exploration 
Professor Meyers, the leading proponent for the recognition of an 
implied covenant of further exploration, has acknowledged that this 
covenant is “regarded as controversial” and is in a developmental stage.38 
His proposal for recognition or adoption of this covenant has been without 
doubt a matter of controversy.39 Although the implied covenant of further 
                                                                                                                 
 35. 8 O. & G.R. at 737. 
 36. Merrill, “Fulfilling Implied Covenant Obligations Administratively,” 9 Okla. L. 
Rev. 125 (1956); Baldwin v. Kubetz, 148 Cal. App.2d 937, 307 P.2d 1005, 7 O. & G.R. 407 
(1957); Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Bishop, 441 P.2d 436, 30 O. & G.R. 614 (Okla. 1967); 
Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Crews, 448 P.2d 840, 32 O. & G.R. 200 (Okla. 1968). For detailed 
criticism of the Merrill position, see Conn, N. 29 supra at 485–489. 
 37. Merrill, “Implied Covenants and Secondary Recovery,” 4 Okla. L. Rev. 177 (1950). 
See also the opinions in Shailer’s Estate, 266 P.2d 613, 3 O. & G.R. 1397 (Okla. 1954), and 
Wolfson Oil Co. v. Gill, N. 29 supra. 
 38. Meyers, “The Effect of Express Provisions in an Oil and Gas Lease on Implied 
Obligations,” 14th Ann. Inst. on Min. L. 90, 115 (L.S.U. 1967). 
 39. A partial listing of the articles and books which have followed the Meyers article 
cited in N. 1 supra includes: Brown. N. 7 supra, § 16.05; Merrill, “The Implied Covenant of 
Further Exploration,” 4 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 205 (1958); Meyers, “The Covenant of 
Further Exploration: A Comment,” 37 Texas L. Rev. 179 (1958); Brown, “The Proposed 
New Covenant of Further Exploration: Reply to Comment,” 37 Texas L. Rev. 303 (1959); 
Boone, “The Implied Covenant for Additional Development,” 31 Miss. L. J. 34 (1959); 
Galvin, “Meyers v. Brown—Jurisprudence in Action,” 7 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 589 (1960); 
Merrill, “The Implied Covenant of Further Exploration in Oklahoma,” 13 Okla. L. Rev. 249 
(1960); Cohen, “Implied Covenants in Kansas Oil and Gas Leases,” 9 Kan. L. Rev. 7 (1960); 
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exploration has been expressly repudiated by the Texas courts on several 
occasions,40 I believe that it is fair to say that it has had at least some 
development since it was first proposed.41 
Briefly stated, the implied covenant of further exploration would require 
the lessee to undertake additional operations in unexplored strata, both 
                                                                                                                 
Annot., 79 A.L.R 2d 792 (1961); Meyers and Williams, “The Implied Duty to Explore 
Further: Recent Texas Developments,” 41 Texas L. Rev. 789 (1963); Smith, “The Implied 
Duty to Explore Further: Recent Texas Developments A Disagreement,” 42 Texas L. Rev. 
199 1963); see also Munster, “Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Leases in Ohio,” 26 Ohio 
St. L.J. 404 (1965). The author acknowledges the assistance of Mr. Rodney Edwards for 
research on the implied covenant of further exploration. 
 40. Meyers’ proposal was embraced by the Texas Court of Civil Appeals and applied in 
Willingham v. Bryson, 294 S.W.2d 421, 6 O. & G.R. 1094 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956). This 
decision was disapproved by the Texas Supreme Court in Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 
325 S.W.2d 684, 10 O. & G.R. 1109 (1959). In a case arising in Texas decided shortly 
thereafter, the Fifth Circuit distinguished Clifton v. Koontz and held that there was an 
implied covenant of further exploration. Sinclair Oil and Gas Co. v. Masterson, 271 F.2d 
310, 11 O. & G.R. 632 (1959), cert. denied 362 U.S. 952 (1960). Professor Merrill has found 
this to be a proper application of the Erie doctrine in “Sinclair-Masterson: A Study in the 
Role of Federal Courts in Applying State Law,” 14 Okla. L. Rev. 1 (1961). Nevertheless, the 
Texas Court of Civil Appeals rejected Masterson and the further exploration covenant in 
Felmont v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 334 S.W.2d 449. 12 O. & G.R. 717 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1960), error ref’d, n.r.e., and the Fifth Circuit has conceded it may thus have been 
overruled. Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d 84, 25 O. & G.R. 371 at 393, 
n. 47 (5th Cir. 1966). In a recent case, although not necessary for its decision, the Texas 
Court of Civil Appeals has reasserted the Clifton v. Koontz holding that “there is no implied 
obligation to explore as to oil, gas and mineral leases in Texas.” Shell Oil v. Stansbury, N. 
12 supra, 401 S.W.2d at 636. The Mississippi Supreme Court has also expressly rejected the 
existence of a separate implied covenant of further exploration. Monsanto Chemical Co. v. 
Sykes, 147 So.2d 290, 296, 18 O. & G.R. 884, (Miss. 1962), 149 So.2d 20, 18 O. & G.R. 
898 (Miss. 1963). 
 41. Discussions of state law by several writers have indicated support for the implied 
covenant to explore other strata, Cohen, N. 39 supra at 16-18, Munster, N. 39 supra at 415. 
Several courts have expressly declined to hold that there is no such implied covenant or have 
acted as though there is this covenant though not so stating (see the case by case analysis in 
Williams and Meyers N. 5 supra, § 845), and it may be said that the newly adopted 
Louisiana Mineral Code does establish the implied covenant of further exploration. Article 
122 of the Code, La. Rev. Stat. § 31:122 (1974), imposes the lessee’s obligation to act as a 
reasonably prudent operator, and the comments to this article, while viewing the implied 
covenant as an “evolutionary offshoot” of the reasonable development obligation, state 
explicitly: “The jurisprudence since the Carter decision [Carter v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas 
Co., 213 La. 1028, 36 So.2d 26 (1948)] has recognized that the obligation of further 
exploration is embodied in our law.” It is perhaps noteworthy that Williams and Meyers 
have commented that the Louisiana courts have pushed the duty to explore too far. Williams 
and Meyers, N. 5 supra, § 845.4 at 341. 
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vertically and laterally on the leasehold. To establish breach of the 
covenant, the lessor would have to give evidence that the strata is 
potentially productive and that it is unreasonable not to drill exploratory 
wells even though the lessor cannot prove that the drilling would probably 
be profitable.42 The loss to the lessor from breach of the implied covenant is 
said to be the value of a test on the land for new producing horizons. Since 
this is largely unquantifiable, the remedy is not damages, but cancellation 
or conditional cancellation of the unexplored portions of the lease should 
the lessee refuse to drill.43 The prudent operator, it is presumed, would, 
under the proper circumstances, drill exploratory wells without a reasonable 
expectation of profitable production from its operations. The factors to be 
shown by the lessor to establish breach of the covenant are similar to the 
ones discussed in relation to the implied covenant of reasonable 
development.44 
It is Professor Meyers’ position that the courts have long enforced a duty 
to explore without referring to an implied covenant of further exploration. 
Without quibbling over the rationale given in particular cases,45 I believe it 
is beyond question that there are many implied covenant decisions in favor 
of lessors in which the lessors have either failed or have not been required 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Williams and Meyers, N. 5 supra, § 841. 
 43. Ibid. Of course, if there are minerals that have not been produced, the lessor has lost 
the interest that would have accrued had the minerals been produced at an earlier time. An 
interesting case would be that in which the lessor establishes that a prudent operator should 
have undertaken further exploration several years earlier, the court awards conditional 
cancellation, the lessee drills and produces great quantities of minerals, and the lessor than 
seeks to recover the interest he could have received had those minerals been produced at the 
time when the exploration should have commenced. Reasoning from Williams and Meyers’ 
premises, there is nothing to prevent the lessor from recovering. 
 44. See text at Ns. 23-26 supra. See also Meyers, N. 1 supra at 562–571. 
 45. See the discussion of cases in Brown, N. 7 supra, § 16.05. In the case of Sauder v. 
Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 292 U.S. 272 (1934), a case relied upon heavily by 
Professor Meyers, the Supreme Court may have been influenced by the fact that it was 
believed that Kansas law (until Fischer v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 156 Kan. 367, 133 P.2d 
95 (1943)) imposed an absolute duty to drill on lessees, contrary to the law of other 
jurisdictions. That is, had the Supreme Court decided otherwise than it did, it would have 
had to decide the question of the existence of a federal common law, a question it preferred 
to leave unanswered until Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See Merrill, N. 4 
supra, § 144 at 332. Sawder is, however, relied upon in some cases in other states to impose 
a requirement of further exploration without reference to this aspect of the case; e.g., Nolan 
v. Thomas, 228 Ark. 572, 309 S.W.2d 727, 9 O. & G.R. 1 (1958). The Oklahoma cases turn 
on the failure of the lessee to explain an unreasonable delay in further drilling. Still other 
cases turn on the willingness of another operator to drill in the face of the lessee’s declared 
intent not to undertake additional drilling. 
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to prove that drilling will probably result in commercial production, 
whether in a known producing formation or in unexplored strata. The 
usefulness of Professor Meyers’ observation is to call attention to what the 
courts have expected of prudent operators. Not only have they required 
drilling when there was a basis for believing that drilling would be 
profitable, but also when there was no such basis because there had been no 
exploration. 
The problem with Professor Meyers’ proposal to recognize this as a 
separate implied covenant is that once an idea or theory is given 
recognition, it takes on a life of its own, separate from the considerations 
which gave rise to it. This is, perhaps, what Meyers intended, for he has 
since given greater emphasis to public policy reasons46 for implying such a 
separate covenant, irrespective of the factors that originally led courts to 
require drilling or cancellation in unexplored areas. The danger lies in the 
tendency of ideas to be carried step by step to their logical extreme. Once it 
is accepted that a lessee has a duty to explore and that the public has an 
interest in exploration, the lessor will need to show relatively little else to 
convince judge or jury that the lessee is not fulfilling that duty in a disputed 
case.47 For reasons which follow, I believe it would be preferable not to 
focus on whether a known formation or unexplored strata is involved, but 
rather on the standard by which one measures prudent operation under a 
lease. Since my suggestion is that further drilling requirements be looked 
upon with greater disfavor by the courts, it is not of much significance 
whether that drilling be in a known or an unexplored area. In short, my 
position is that it is often unwise to require drilling by a lessee even if the 
lessor can show a likelihood of commercial productivity. Before getting 
into that, I will treat briefly the implied covenant to market the product. 
The Implied Covenant to Market 
The implied covenant to market the product from the lease has primarily 
had case law significance with respect to natural gas. The reasons for this 
have been the necessity of extending expensive pipeline facilities to the 
point of production, the length of time necessary to establish a market for 
the gas, and the disparity in pricing between the interstate and the intrastate 
markets for gas resulting from Federal Power Commission control of 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Meyers and Williams, “The Implied Duty to Explore Further: Recent Texas 
Developments,” N. 39 supra at 808–809. 
 47. Professor Meyers has conceded that “the covenant of further exploration is subject 
to abuse.” N. 1 supra at 581. 
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interstate prices.48 The implied covenant is to the effect that the lessee is 
under a duty to use due diligence in marketing the product49 once it has 
been discovered and produced.50 
The prudent operator standard is generally held to apply to this covenant 
also,51 but there is language in some of the cases that suggests a lesser 
standard. 
There are several aspects of the marketing covenant to which I wish to 
call attention and to suggest a problem I feel they pose. First, there is 
considerable authority that there is a duty owed by the lessee to obtain the 
best price possible for the gas,52 a duty which can arise either under a 
“market value” or a “proceeds” royalty clause.53 Second, there are several 
                                                                                                                 
 48. See Lelong v. Richardson, 126 So.2d 819, 823, 14 O. & G.R. 951 (La. App. 1961), 
and the authorities cited infra Ns. 53–54. 
 49. Wolfe v. Texas Co., 83 F.2d 425 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 299 U.S. 553 (1936); 
Craig v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 933, 37 O. & G.R. 457 (10th Cir. 1971); Merrill, 
N. 4 supra at § 84; Williams and Meyers, N. 5 supra, § 853; Brown, N. 7 supra, § 16.02(4). 
 50. In most jurisdictions, a lease will terminate automatically if the oil or gas is not 
being marketed at the end of the primary term and the lease is not being held under a shut-in 
royalty clause. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Barnhill, 107 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). 
However, in Oklahoma, once petroleum is found in paying quantities, the lessee has a 
reasonable time in which to market the product even if this extends beyond the primary terra. 
Flag Oil Corp. v. King Resources Co., 494 P.2d 322, 41 O. & G.R. 545 (Okla. 1972). 
Williams and Meyers, N. 5 supra, § 853 at 391. 
 51. Although the phrase “due diligence” is used generally, the courts seem to put more 
emphasis on good faith than in implied covenant of reasonable development cases. See 
Greenshields v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 61, 8 O. & G.R. 937, 942 (10th Cir.), 
cert. denied 355 U.S. 907 (1957); Waechter v. Amoco Production Co., 537 P.2d 228, — O. 
& G.R. — (Kan. 1975). See also Nordan-Lawton Oil & Gas Corp, of Texas v. Miller, 272 F. 
Supp. 125, 137, 27 O. & G.R. 593, 608 (W.D. La.) (“operators are not held to such an all-
knowing standard that is only revealed by ex post facto judgments”), 276 F. Supp. 16, 27 O. 
& G.R. 610 (W.D. La. 1967), aff’d 403 F.2d 946, 31 O. & G.R. 526 (5th Cir. 1968), which 
cites the section in Williams and Meyers, N. 5 supra, § 856.3, which argues in favor of a less 
onerous standard. 
 52. Merrill, N. 4 supra, § 84 at 212–213 states that “the concept of diligence in 
marketing should include the duty to realize the highest price obtainable by the exercise of 
reasonable effort,” and cites a number of cases in accord in the 1964 Supplement at 66–67. 
See also Johnson v. Jernigan, 475 P.2d 396, 37 O. & G.R. 240, 245 (Okla. 1970) (“The 
lessee is obligated to develop the commodity he has found so that it will bring the highest 
possible market price.”); Harding v. Cameron, 63 F. Supp. 466, 19 O. & G.R. 352 (W.D. 
Okla. 1963). 
 53. In several recent cases, the lessee has been held to be under a duty to pay a royalty 
on the “market value” of the gas, as determined by other transactions in the area, even 
though this is at a higher rate than that received by the lessee. Foster v. Atlantic Refining 
Co., 329 F.2d 485, 20 O. & G.R. 422 (5th Cir. 1964); Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 
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significant cases holding that a prudent operator would withhold production 
of gas for a time while waiting to obtain the best price possible for the gas 
even though the operator has an opportunity to sell before that time at a 
lower price.54 The problem I see is that a lessee may have a duty to sell gas 
in the intrastate market if it can get a higher price there even if it would 
prefer to sell into the interstate market and even if this requires shutting in 
the gas for a time while awaiting a market. The concerns that this presents 
are twofold. First, the obligation to the lessor to obtain the highest price 
may be forcing gas into the intrastate market that the lessee might otherwise 
sell into the interstate market despite the lower price, and such gas may be 
going to inferior uses.55 Second, there is a possibility a producer who shuts 
in gas wells in order to obtain a higher price for the gas is subjecting itself 
to federal investigation, not to mention adverse public reaction.56 Both of 
these concerns can affect the decision-making process of the prudent 
operator. 
These then are the three implied covenants and what they are generally 
held to require of lessees when they are found to apply. Now, it is time to 
consider their basis and their wisdom. 
  
                                                                                                                 
S.W.2d 866, 29 O. & G.R. 121 (Tex. 1968); and see Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas 
Co., 367 F.2d 84, 25 O. & G.R. 371 (5th Cir. 1966). While such cases have turned on the 
interpretation of “market value” in the lease, the same result might be reached from an 
implied covenant to market approach. See also Morris, “The Gas Royalty Clause—What is 
Market Value?” 25th Oil & Gas Inst. 63 (Matthew Bender 1974). 
 54. Gazin v. Pan-American Petroleum Corp., 367 P.2d 1010, 16 O. & G.R. 1009 (Okla. 
1961); Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 517 P.2d 432, 47 O. & G.R. 168 (Okla. 1973). See 
Norton-Lawton Oil & Gas Corp, of Texas v. Miller, N. 51 supra, 27 O. & G.R. at 608. See 
also Sandlin, “Intrastate Marketing of Gas, The Implied Covenant to Market and the Shut-In 
Gas Well Royalty,” 17 Ark. L. Rev. 104 (1963). 
 55. Partly in recognition of the burden on interstate commerce caused by the duty to pay 
market value royalties to lessors, the Federal Power Commission attempted to assert 
jurisdiction over royalty payments, but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit held that the Commission had no such jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act; the 
case presented, the court said, only “a cursory ‘makeweight’ reference to a possible theory of 
economic burden. . . .” Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Commission, 463 F.2d 256, 43 O. 
& G.R. 106, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied 406 U.S. 976, reh’g denied 409 U.S. 902 
(1972). For discussion of the effects of the differentiation in price between the interstate and 
the intrastate markets, see MacAvoy, “The Regulation-Induced Shortage of Natural Gas,” 14 
J. Law & Econ. 167 (1971), and Breyer and MacAvoy, “The Natural Gas Shortage and the 
Regulation of Natural Gas Producers,” 86 Harv. L. Rev. 941 (1973). 
 56. See Energy Users Report, Oct. 30, 1975, A-13; Dec. 11, 1975, A-l, A-15. 
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The Basis of Implied Covenants 
There are several views as to how implied covenants arise. The position 
of Professor Walker in his influential series of articles in the Texas Law 
Review was that the implication of covenants “is predicated upon the inten-
tion of the parties and is one of fact and not of law.”57 The contrary view is 
that of Professor Merrill, who has maintained that an implied covenant is a 
fiction adopted by a court to do justice to the lessor.58 “The obligations,” he 
states, “are imposed, not by the agreement of the parties, but by operation 
of law.”59 The Williams and Meyers treatise attempts a synthesis of these 
two views, saying that implied covenants arise in fact and in law and rest 
ultimately upon the contract principle of cooperation.60 The most tenable 
position is Professor Merrill’s, and it is important that this he recognized, 
for, if the covenants are court-created, they can more readily be court-
modified. 
When the parties enter into a lease, they typically provide expressly for 
the drilling of a well61 and, if there is production, that the lease shall remain 
in effect for the entire premises so long as there is production from the 
lease. Because there are many unknowns involved when the lease is 
executed, it is understood that much must be left to the judgment and 
discretion of the lessee.62 When an implied covenant case arises, the lessee 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Walker, N. 8 supra at 405. There are several cases specifically holding that 
covenants are implied in fact. Texas & Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Stuard, 7 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1928), error ref’d; Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Rosamond, 190 Okla. 
46, 120 P.2d 349 (1941). It should be noted that each gave the lessors the benefit of a longer 
statute of limitations; it would be anomalous for a court to imply a right in favor of a lessor 
and then diminish or destroy that right by holding that such a right is a fiction indulged in by 
courts to aid a lessor. 
 58. Merrill, N. 4 supra, §§ 7, 220. 
 59. Id., §7 at 27. 
 60. Williams and Meyers, N. 5 supra, § 802.1. 
 61. The drilling may be excused by the payment of delay rentals. If neither is done, the 
lease terminates automatically. For reasons for the development of the lease in this form, see 
Moses, N. 11 supra. 
 62. Once the lease is executed, the lessor’s role is entirely passive; all he must do is to 
allow the lessee to use the surface, if the lessor owns it, to the extent that is reasonably 
necessary to develop the minerals. See Gray, “A New Appraisal of the Rights of Lessees 
under Oil and Gas Leases to Use and Occupy the Surface,” 20 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 227 
(1975). He generally receives a cost-free royalty on production while the lessee must bear all 
the risks of exploration and development. Because the lessor will receive a royalty on any 
production from the lease, regardless of whether production will be sufficient to repay the 
costs of finding and producing it, he has no economic disincentive to demanding additional 
drilling. 
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has fulfilled his express obligation to drill, the lease is being held by 
production, and the lessor is receiving royalties. The lessor’s complaint is 
that the lessee has exercised his judgment and discretion improperly or in 
bad faith to the detriment of the lessor. What the court must pass judgment 
on is the conduct of the lessee in meeting the express duty to produce in 
order to prevent automatic termination of the lease. 
Thus, it can be seen that the implication of a covenant is inextricably 
intertwined with the test to determine whether the covenant has been 
fulfilled, the prudent operator standard. Recognition of this has prompted 
several authorities to suggest there is, indeed, only one implied covenant, an 
implied covenant of prudent operation.63 
The implied covenants arise, then, as a means of measuring the exercise 
of the judgment and discretion of the lessee, and some courts state frankly 
that they are seeking to protect the lessor from the inequality of position 
that exists between the lessor and lessee and correct inequity.64 As Professor 
Kuntz has pointed out in reexamining the fact-law distinction, the implied 
covenants do not arise as a matter of extending the conscious intention of 
the lessor and lessee to cover matters not mentioned in the agreement, but 
as a matter of determining the duties that should be incident to the relation 
of the parties.65 “This situation,” he states, “is much more accurately 
described as involving rights implied in law rather than as involving rights 
implied in fact.”66 This becomes most obvious when a court refuses to give 
effect to an express lease provision because it “smacks of fraud or unfair 
dealing,” and goes on to find an implied covenant binding the lessee.67 
                                                                                                                 
 63. See Masterson, “A 1952 Survey of Basic Oil and Gas Law,” 6 Sw. L.J. 1, 45 (1952); 
Galvin, N. 39 supra at 605–606; and Huie, Woodward and Smith, Oil and Gas Cases and 
Materials 594 (2d ed. 1972). As stated previously, implied covenants in Louisiana all fall 
within Article 122 which provides simply that a mineral lessee is obligated “to develop and 
operate the property leased as a reasonably prudent operator for the mutual benefit of 
himself and his lessor.” La. Rev. Stat. § 31:122. 
 64. See the court’s statement to this effect in Ferguson v. Gulf Oil Corp., 192 Okla. 355, 
137 P.2d 940, 943 (1943). 
 65. Kuntz, “Professor Merrill’s Contribution to Oil and Gas Law,” 25 Okla. L. Rev. 484 
(1972). 
 66. Id. at 488. 
 67. Williams v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., N. 12 supra, 432 F.2d at 178. Implied 
covenants can be displaced by express covenants, Gulf Production Co. v. Kishi, 129 Tex. 
487, 103 S.W.2d 965 (1937), Labbe v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 350 S.W.2d 873, 15 O. & 
G.R. 526 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961), error ref’d, n.r.e., but such provisions will be strictly con-
strued, and the lessee will still be held to a good faith standard. See Merrill, “Lease Clauses 
Affecting Implied Covenants” 2d Oil & Gas Inst. 141 (Matthew Bender 1951), and Meyers, 
N. 38 supra. 
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The Williams and Meyers principle of cooperation has some appeal, but 
I believe it is ill-founded as a basis for imposing the prudent operator 
standard upon lessees. In putting forth their position, they rely on two lines 
of contract cases that they feel may be treated together as the principle of 
cooperation.68 One line is that in which the contractual obligations of both 
parties are clear, such as one party must obtain a building permit and the 
other party must do the construction, but they have failed to specify the 
time of performance. Where the construction cannot go forward without the 
permit, the court will find that the obligation must be fulfilled within a 
reasonable time.69 This is far different from the implied covenant case in 
which not only is time a factor, but there is also a dispute whether there is 
even an obligation to drill a particular well or do some similar act. Multiple 
variables of great complexity that involve numerous matters of professional 
business and scientific judgment are present in an implied covenant case.70 
The other type of case relied on by Williams and Meyers is exemplified 
by the well-known Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon case.71 In this famous case, the 
defendant was a fashion designer who gave the plaintiff the exclusive right 
to place her indorsements and market, or license others to market, her 
designs, in return for which the plaintiff was to give her fifty percent of any 
profits he made. The fashion designer then went to another party and placed 
indorsements in violation of the agreement. When the plaintiff sued her, she 
took the position that the contract was invalid because the plaintiff had not 
bound himself to do anything. Mr. Justice Cardozo, then on the New York 
bench, overcame this argument by implying a promise on the part of the 
plaintiff to use “reasonable efforts to place the defendant’s indorsements 
and market her designs.”72 Cardozo was finding valuable consideration so 
as to uphold the contract for the plaintiff; he was not passing judgment on 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Williams and Meyers, N. 5 supra, § 802.1. 
 69. Weeks v. Rector, etc., of Trinity Church, 56 App. Div. 195, 67 N.Y. Supp. 670 
(1900). In this case, relied on by Williams and Meyers, it was a statute that put the duty upon 
the defendant to procure the necessary permit, and not only did the defendant admit that it 
had a duty to get the permit but had, in fact, attempted to do so. It had filed forms so 
defectively that the superintendent of buildings refused to issue a permit; and after being 
notified of the defeat, it refused or neglected to remedy it until it was too late to obtain a 
permit—a strange case to carry one to the point of finding an implied duty of further 
exploration in an oil and gas lease. 
 70. See generally, Campbell, Oil Property Evaluation (1959), and Megill, Exploration 
Economics (1971). 
 71. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (Ct. App. 1917). 
 72. Ibid. 
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the performance of the plaintiff in meeting his express obligation.73 The 
standard used to judge whether “reasonable efforts” have been made in this 
type of contract case is a good faith test. The contract law in this area is 
summarized in American Jurisprudence 2d: 
“As a general rule, there is implied in every contract for work or 
services a duty to perform it skilfully, carefully, diligently, and 
in a workmanlike manner. 
. . . 
“. . . It seems, however, that he [the promisor] is not liable for an 
error due to an honest mistake of judgment, and not to gross 
ignorance.”74 
Williams and Meyers, however, treat the Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon case as 
though it imposed on the plaintiff not only a promise to make reasonable 
efforts to carry out his side of the bargain hut also an objective standard in 
measuring whether he had used “due diligence” in fulfilling the implied 
promise. They state, “[T]he good faith test fails to meet the requirements of 
the principle of cooperation upon which implied covenants ultimately 
rest.”75 In other words, they use the principle of cooperation both to find a 
promise and to impose an objective standard of conduct in fulfilling that 
promise. This, I believe, goes beyond what most courts have done in con-
tract law cases invoking a principle of cooperation. 
The law of implied covenants, then, does not arise from the intent of the 
parties nor from an analogous principle in contract law. Rather it grows out 
of an attempt on the part of the courts to promote what they perceive to be 
justice and fair dealing by requiring lessees to adhere to a particular norm 
of conduct, the prudent operator standard. If it appears that justice, fair 
dealing, and the best interests of society are not served by imposing a 
certain type of conduct on lessees, then there is nothing to hinder the courts 
in modifying the content of the prudent operator standard.76 
  
                                                                                                                 
 73. See also McMichael v. Price, 177 Okla. 186, 58 P.2d 549 (1936). 
 74. 17 Am. Jur. 2d, “Contracts” § 371. Cf. Sylvan Crest Sand & Gravel Co. v. United 
States, 150 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 75. Williams and Meyers, N. 5 supra, § 806.2 at 35. 
 76. Even where the state has adopted a prudent operator rule by statute, there should be 
no barrier to reconsidering the meaning of “prudent.” 
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The Prudent Operator Standard 
The prudent operator standard, as mentioned previously, has been widely 
adopted to measure a lessee’s conduct under a mineral lease. While 
generally regarded as a middle ground between a good faith test and the 
imposition of some form of absolute duty on the lessee,77 it is quite 
impossible to say precisely what the standard is, for its application varies 
from court to court. Some cases relying on the prudent operator standard 
could easily have been decided under a good faith test. Other cases using 
the same words of the prudent operator standard seem to impose absolute 
duties on a lessee without regard to what a truly prudent operator would 
do.78 
The prudent operator standard presumes generally that a prudent operator 
will drill whenever it can make a profit for itself and for the lessor.79 The 
issue normally presented is whether there would be profit from drilling. The 
test apparently employed in many, though certainly not all, cases is whether 
there is a reasonable basis for believing that it would be profitable to drill.80 
If the lessor sustains the burden of showing this, he often wins. As applied, 
the prudent operator standard appears to differ from a good faith test81 in 
that even though it is established that a lessee believes it is acting as a 
prudent operator and even though it is established that there is a reasonable 
basis for the lessee to believe this, the prudent operator standard will permit 
a judge or jury to find that the lessee has not acted as a prudent operator.82 
                                                                                                                 
 77. Merrill, N. 4 supra, Ch. VI; Williams and Meyers, N. 5 supra, § 806. It is 
interesting to note that Illinois gives the lessee the right to act as a prudent operator. Smith-
Hurd Ann. Stat., Ch. 104, § 89. 
 78. Professor Kuntz has observed that to keep his lease free from liability, the lessee 
“may be required to do something downright reckless.” Kuntz, “The Prudent Operator and 
Further Development,” 4th Ann. Inst. on Min. L. 1, 15 (L.S.U. 1956). 
 79. See text at N. 27. 
 80. See Cowden v. General Crude Oil Co., 217 S.W.2d 109, 114 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948), 
error ref’d, n.r.e. (“It is thought under the implied covenant to reasonably develop the duty 
to drill on any particular portion of the leased area arises when there is a reasonable prospect 
of developing paying production.”) and other cases discussed in Williams and Meyers, N. 5 
supra, § 833.3. 
 81. E.g., Kellar v. Craig, 126 Fed. 630, 633 (4th Cir. 1903): “The lessee or his assigns 
are permitted to determine the character of the work to be done, and such ascertainment by 
him or them, in the absence of fraud disposes of the question.” 
 82. See Vonfeldt v. Hanes, 196 Kan. 719, 414 P.2d 7, 11–12, 25 O. & G.R. 127 (1966): 
“It is universally recognized that geology is not an exact science. Therefore, in cases of this 
type courts are concerned with probabilities or reasonable expectations. Thus, when a 
qualified expert witness expresses an opinion that oil could be produced from the unde-
veloped portion of a tract in question with reasonable expectations that it would be produced 
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When this approach is combined with a policy in favor of development83 
and a policy against “speculation,”84 the lessor needs to show relatively 
little to prevail and receive an award of damages and/or conditional cancel-
lation of a portion of the lease which would otherwise be continued in 
effect by the express provisions of the lease. 
The most authoritative, and most often relied upon, case for the prudent 
operator standard is Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc,85 a 1905 opinion by Mr. 
Justice Van Devanter, then on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. The 
case should be placed in its proper perspective, for it has been used rather 
indiscriminately by the courts for many years. It is true that Van Devanter 
set forth a higher standard than good faith, but the reasons for this higher 
standard have often been overlooked. Brewster was a drainage case, and 
Van Devanter specifically said that the reason for imposing a higher duty 
was the fugacious nature of petroleum. He stated: 
“Considering the migratory nature of oil and gas, and the danger 
of their being drawn off through wells on other lands if the field 
should become fully developed, all of which must have been in 
the minds of the parties, it is manifest that the terms of the lease 
contemplated action and diligence on the part of the lessee. . . . 
“. . . . 
“If [operations] do not proceed with reasonable diligence, and by 
reason thereof the oil and gas are diminished or exhausted 
through the operation of wells on adjoining lands, the lessor 
loses, not only royalties to which he would otherwise be entitled, 
but also his contingent interest in the oil and gas which thus 
passes into the control of others.”86 
                                                                                                                 
therefrom in paying quantities, it is sufficient evidence upon which to base a finding that the 
lessee has failed to comply with the obligation imposed by the implied covenant to develop 
the lease, provided the facts upon which an expert opinion is based afforded a reasonably 
accurate basis for the conclusion reached, as distinguished from a mere guess or conjecture.” 
(quoting Stamper v. Jones, Shelburne & Farmer, Inc., 188 Kan. 626, 364 P.2d 972, 15 O. & 
G.R. 12 (1961)). 
 83. Renner v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 187 Kan. 158, 354 P.2d 326, 333, 13 O. & G.R. 
448 (1960); Davenport v. Shoenfelt, 191 Ky. 234, 229 S.W. 1043 (1921). 
 84. Vickers v. Vining, N. 25 supra; Carter v. United States Smelting, Refining & Min. 
Co., N. 29 supra; Banks v. Calstar Petroleum Co., 82 Cal. App. 2d 789, 187 P.2d 127, 128 
(1947). 
 85. 140 Fed. 801 (8th Cir. 1905). 
 86. Id. at 810, 814. 
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Van Devanter noted that it was a “plain and substantial disregard” of the 
requirement of prudent operation that constituted a breach of the covenant.87 
In addition, the “existence of gas in paying quantity in one of the tracts was 
an ascertained fact,” admitted by the lessee,88 and not a matter of honest 
dispute between the parties. 
A higher standard than good faith is perhaps defensible for drainage 
cases, but not for cases involving the development and further exploration 
covenants. Loss to the lessor in these cases is generally at best conjectural. 
It can be surmised that the standard was carried into these other cases 
because the courts did not distinguish among the covenants due to the 
primitive state of scientific knowledge89 and because lessors have often 
alleged drainage and failure to develop at the same time.90 
Separating the drainage question from the issue, how is the higher 
standard imposed on mineral lessees than on other businessmen to be 
justified in reasonable development and exploration cases? As noted 
already, only a good faith test is generally required under analogous cir-
cumstances in the law of contracts.91 In measuring the performance of 
corporate officers and directors in the exercise of their judgment and 
discretion in corporation law, a business judgment rule is employed which 
tests good faith. This rule has been stated as follows: 
“Under the business judgment doctrine, acts of directors, within 
the powers of the corporation, in the furtherance of its business, 
made in good faith and in the exercise of an honest judgment, are 
valid and conclude the corporation and its shareholders. 
Questions of management policy, contract expediency and 
adequate consideration are left to their honest and unselfish 
decision, judgment and discretion and may not be interfered with 
or restrained.”92 
                                                                                                                 
 87. Id. at 815. 
 88. Ibid. 
 89. See the discussion in Moses, N. 11 supra at 3–5. He notes that as late as 1921, a 
Texas court stated that oil and gas “are supposed to percolate restlessly about under the 
surface of the earth, even as the birds fly from field to field and the beasts roam from forest 
to forest. . . .” quoting Medina Oil Development Co. v. Murphy, 233 S.W. 333, 335 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1921). 
 90. E.g., Vickers v. Vining, N. 25 supra. 
 91. See text at N. 74. 
 92. Heimann v. American Express Co., 279 N.Y.S.2d 867, 881, 53 Misc. 2d 749 (Sup. 
Ct. 1967). 
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It may be felt that lessors need special protection from lessees.93 What is 
so extraordinary about the interest of the lessor that it must be given a 
higher degree of protection than the shareholder of the same lessee? It is the 
lessor’s oil, some may argue. But so, too, is it the shareholder’s money. If 
anything, the lessor’s interest may be less deserving of protection, for the 
shareholder’s investment often represents an accumulation of capital earned 
by work while the lessor’s interest is more likely to be acquired as a 
fortuitous incident to the purchase of land for its surface uses. It is also 
worthy of note that by the time a suit to cancel a portion of a lease has been 
brought, the lessee has, in most cases, already invested a great deal more in 
the leased premises than the lessor. Once the lessee has established that it is 
acting in good faith (i.e., not in the deliberate disregard of the lessor’s 
interest) and that there is a reasonable basis for its belief it is acting 
prudently, why should the lessee’s interest not be given greater weight than 
it often is?94 While I believe the basis for the high standard for judging 
business decisions of mineral lessees has always been rather dubious, there 
are other reasons for modifying the current notions of the prudent operator 
standard. 
Not only was scientific knowledge relatively primitive when the prudent 
operator standard was formulated, but so too was our understanding of 
economics and our perception of the public interest. The social and 
economic context in which the prudent operator standard arose has changed 
radically since Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc, but the courts have, for the most 
part, failed to take these changed conditions into consideration in implied 
covenant cases. They continue to act as though implied covenant cases 
should only redress an imbalance of power between lessor and lessee, and 
they fail to recognize the larger consequences of their rulings. The role and 
responsibilities of the corporate lessee have changed greatly, and there are a 
great many more restraints upon the corporation today than three-quarters 
                                                                                                                 
 93. See Merrill, N. 4 supra, § 221 at 468. 
 94. Williams and Meyers, N. 5 supra, § 847 at 385, argue that the loss to the lessee from 
cancellation of unexplored acreage or formations is relatively slight. The loss is all the 
minerals that the lessee might have recovered had the lessee been allowed to proceed with 
further exploration at the rate it thought prudent. There will also be a loss to the public if 
drilling is required and the capital and materials could be put to better use elsewhere. The 
loss when a portion of a lease is cancelled for failure to develop reasonably is the same; in 
addition, if new wells are drilled by another operator, they may drain production the lessee 
would otherwise have had from existing wells. Further, cancellation of a portion of a lease 
may hinder greatly the undertaking of secondary recovery operations at a later date. See 
Vonfeldt v. Hanes, N. 82 supra. 
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of a century ago. At that time, corporations were expected to seek to be 
profit maximizers and were expected to take all actions necessary to this 
end unless positively prohibited from specific acts by law. In the classic 
model of capitalism then prevailing, corporations and individual 
businessmen would thereby promote the general economic welfare.95 This 
concept of the proper role of the corporation is, if not entirely discredited, 
languishing today. In the face of vigorous onslaughts on private business, it 
is recognized by many commentators within as well as outside of business 
that corporations must, in order to survive, consider the public interest as 
part of any business decision and must in some instances put immediate 
profit second to other considerations; corporations must work in 
cooperation with government, almost as an arm of the state, lest the state 
entirely absorb the present functions of private business.96 Adolf Berle has 
observed that in twentieth century capitalism, increasingly “the 
development is toward a mixed system in which governmental and private 
property are inextricably mingled.”97 Public opinion, he notes, must be 
considered in business decisions, and the “real guarantee of non-statist 
industrial organization in America is a substantially satisfied public.”98 
Prudence, then, dictates that the corporate lessee consider the long-term 
economic and political consequences of its actions, regardless of whether 
these actions will result in immediate profit. It must respond to what it per-
ceives to be governmental policy and to what it believes to be the most 
likely to maintain long-term favorable public opinion, regardless of the fact 
that the state has not mandated or prohibited a particular course of action. In 
sum, the prudent operator today would consider a much wider range of 
factors than a prudent operator of a half century or more ago. A standard 
that presumes a prudent operator will drill any time there is a probability of 
profit is outmoded and is possibly harmful to the best interests of the public. 
                                                                                                                 
 95. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919); Cochran, The 
American Business System: A Historical Perspective 1900-1955, pp. 98–100 (1957); 
Cochran and Miller, The Age of Enterprise: A Social History of Industrial America 119–128 
(rev. ed. 1961); Galbraith, Economics and the Public Purpose 103–104 (Signet ed. 1973). 
 96. See the discussion of the scope of corporation directors’ responsibilities in Cary, 
Corporations 237–243 (4th ed. 1969). See also, Wilcox, Public Policies Toward Business 
13–14 (4th ed. 1971); Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (rev. 
ed. 1967); Galbraith, The New Industrial State 399–400 (Mentor ed. 1967); Drucker, 
Concept of the Corporation 15–19, 209–229 (1946); Drucker, Management, Chs. 26–27 
(1973); Silk, “The Role of the Business Corporation in the Economy and Society,” in Smith 
and DeVyver, Economic Systems and Public Policy (1966). 
 97. Berle, The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution 109 (1954). 
 98. Id. at 59. 
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When the lessee’s interest is subordinated to the public interest, it is only 
proper that the lessor’s interest likewise be subordinated. If the lessee is to 
be penalized for acting in what it believes to be the public interest, the 
lessee is less likely to act in the public interest. The only loss to the lessor 
with respect to the implied covenants under consideration is that there is a 
possibility he may not realize his maximum profit. The same may be said of 
the lessor that John Kenneth Galbraith has said of the shareholder: 
“As the public character of the mature corporation comes to be 
recognized, attention will doubtless focus on the position of the 
stockholder in this corporation. This is anomalous. He is a 
passive and functionless figure, remarkable only in his capacity 
to share, without effort or even without appreciable risk. . . .”99 
It is my proposal that the prudent operator standard be modified to give 
due regard to the fact that the lessee must often act upon its perceptions of 
its duties under express and implied governmental policies and public 
opinion. When public interest factors are arguably present in measuring a 
lessee’s conduct under a mineral lease, in a case brought by the lessor or his 
successor in interest, the proper test is whether the lessee has acted in good 
faith and had a reasonable basis for its judgment. This is the truer test of the 
prudent operator.100 The way in which public interest factors may arise will 
be considered under the next heading. 
Recent Legislation and Regulation Affecting Implied Covenants 
From the perspective these last several troubled years have given us, it 
seems a reasonable conclusion that the law of implied covenants has ill-
served the nation. Reasonable development for the lessor historically has 
meant overdevelopment for the country. It has led to extravagant, wasteful 
consumption of petroleum and too rapid a depletion of this finite resource. 
By fostering production when its desirability has been questionable, it has 
prevented the proper functioning of market mechanisms that would balance 
supply and demand over time. 
Cognizant of the excessive production caused by the rule of capture and 
the development obligations of lessees, the producing states four decades 
                                                                                                                 
 99. Galbraith, N. 96 supra at 401. 
 100. I see no reason why this test should present any more difficulty in its application 
than the determination of what an objective prudent operator would do. Cf. Williams and 
Meyers, N. 5 supra, § 806.2 at 34–35. And see Blythe v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 271 F.2d 
861, 11 O. & G.R. 609 (10th Cir. 1959). 
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ago enacted conservation laws. Their purpose was to restrain and ration-
alize production.101 That these laws and the regulatory agencies acting 
pursuant to them have had a significant effect upon the law of implied 
covenants is unquestionable. However, the courts have treated the laws and 
regulations as having only a force majeure effect102 rather than as 
modifying the policies in favor of development and against 
“speculation.”103 That is to say, the implied covenants are still applicable 
and must be fulfilled unless the lessee is prevented from doing so by the 
well-spacing or prorationing restrictions of the state. The plea of a 
perceptive speaker104 before this Institute twenty-two years ago for the 
replacement of the development philosophy by a philosophy of 
conservation in implied covenant litigation was largely unheeded. 
The law of implied covenants, even after the institution of a regime of 
conservation, has required operators to maximize short-term profitability 
rather than seek long-term maximization (which may be regarded as long-
term profitability or as institutional survival). If the operator has the 
possibility of making a profit now by drilling, he must, even though it 
might make more for both the lessor and itself over the long term by 
delaying development. The law at present regards a willingness to delay 
development and further exploration as speculation. The field of economics 
                                                                                                                 
 101. See generally, Murphy (ed.), Conservation of Oil and Gas in Legal History (1948); 
Interstate Oil Compact Commission, A Study of Conservation of Oil and Gas in the United 
States (1964); Lovejoy and Homan, Economic Aspects of Oil Conservation Regulation, Ch. 
2 (1967); McDonald, Petroleum Conservation in the United States: An Economic Analysis 
35–38 (1971); Summers, “The Modern Theory and Practical Application of Statutes for the 
Conservation of Oil and Gas,” in Legal History of Conservation of Oil and Gas 1, 4–5 
(1938). 
 102. Railroad Commission v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 19 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1946), error ref’d, n.r.e., aff’d per curiam 331 U.S. 791, reh’g denied 332 U.S. 786 
(1946); Renner v. Monsanto Chemical Co., N. 83 supra; Richardson, “Doctrine of 
Development Covenants Re-examined in Light of Express Covenants and Conservation,” 
9th Oil & Gas Inst. 321 (Matthew Bender 1958); Cline, “Implied Covenants—The New 
Look Under Conservation Laws,” 6 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 471 (1961). 
 103. Indeed, the fact that the state regulatory body does not prohibit the drilling of certain 
wells may be used to imply a covenant that such wells should be drilled. See Vickers v. 
Vining, N. 25 supra at 803, and Temple v. Continental Oil, N. 19 supra. See also Meyers, 
“The Effect on Implied Covenants of Conservation Laws and Practices,” 4 Rocky Mt. Min. 
L. Inst. 463 (1953). 
 104. Eberhardt, “Effect of Conservation Laws, Rules and Regulations on Rights of 
Lessors, Lessees and Owners of Unleased Mineral Interests,” 5th Oil Gas Inst. 125 
(Matthew Bender 1954). See also Siefkin, “Effect of Proration on Implied Covenants,” 19 
Okla. B.A.J. 1652 (1948). 
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might regard it as a means of optimizing the benefits of energy 
development over the long run. Speculation is a highly pejorative term 
which in economic fact means simply that the person possessing the 
commodity or controlling the activity believes that it may be worth more at 
a later time than at the present. This in turn means that the optimum value 
of the goods or activity to society, as reflected through the market 
mechanism, may be at a later time than at present. 
To see this, let us assume for a moment that there is only a limited 
supply of materials that can be used to manufacture automobiles. It would 
be a foolish law that would permit a shareholder in the company to force 
the company to turn out automobiles as long as there is a reasonable basis 
for believing a profit can be made. The result would be too many 
automobiles now and not enough later. But this is exactly what the law of 
implied covenants has done over the years. The law of implied covenants 
has told operators that even if they felt it was optimal for themselves and 
for society to develop the scarce petroleum resources under their control 
over time, they had to realize their short-term profit or receive nothing at 
all. Faced with such a choice, operators have naturally taken the short-run 
profits, and this has resulted in resource misallocation for society as a 
whole. This has been bad law and bad policy. Commenting on the 
prevailing system of conservation, with implied covenant law fostering 
rapid development, one economist has recently observed that the system 
has failed “to provide a framework within which the benefits from oil and 
gas may be maximized before they cease to be economic resources.”105 
Because the country is now experiencing domestic shortages, some may 
feel this discussion is of historic interest only. After all, sound policy 
demands exploration and development now, does it not? Yes, but accepting 
this does not tell us where and at what rate exploration and development 
should take place. The best interests of the country may be served by 
having assured supplies of petroleum over a longer time period. From a 
policy standpoint, slow development of known formations may be 
preferable to a more rapid rate of development that would return the 
maximum short-term benefits to the lessor. Through price differentials and 
                                                                                                                 
 105. McDonald, N. 101 supra at 188. Lovejoy and Homan came to somewhat similar 
conclusions, N. 101 supra at 102–119. Professor Howard R. Williams has recently inveighed 
against “profligate waste of resources expended in the drilling of unnecessary wells.” 
Williams, “Some Ingredients of a National Oil and Gas Policy,” 27 Stanford L. Rev. 969, 
973 (1975). It is hoped his criticism also has reference to the unnecessary drilling brought 
about by implied covenant law. Economic waste is also involved in the premature drilling of 
marginal wells. 
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through announced policy, Congress, the Federal Energy Administration, 
and the President are encouraging and discouraging exploration and 
development in different areas.106 Lessees, perhaps, do not need additional 
incentives from the courts, and judicial encouragement of exploration or 
development could hinder national efforts. No doubt the lessor thinks the 
10,000 foot horizon on his forty acres is as deserving of further exploration 
or development and is as important to the national energy supply as a 
5,000-acre tract in the Gulf of Mexico. The corporate lessee with limited 
capital and materials and with national responsibilities must view the matter 
from a different perspective, and the government, too, views it differently. 
In 1974, for example, the Secretary of the Interior told a congressional 
subcommittee that until 1970, there had been slow development of the 
Outer Continental Shelf “so as not to cause abandonment and reduction in 
onshore oil and gas production.”107 Speaking in support of the 
administration’s revised OCS policy, he continued: 
“We realize that the proposed acceleration of Outer Continental 
Shelf leasing will put a great deal of pressure on limited 
resources in rigs, labor and oil country goods. However, we have 
confidence in the capacity of the industry to expand to meet this 
need, and in the meantime to employ scarce resources where 
they will be most productive.”108 
The prudent and responsible operator will heed such policy statements 
and will delay onshore exploration and development if necessary. Failure to 
do so may encourage congressional proposals to take over OCS 
development.109 However, the law of implied covenants allows the forty-
acre lessor to force the lessee to take away capital and materials from OCS 
development to devote it to the forty acres or to suffer the loss of a portion 
of a lease in which it has already invested substantial funds. This leads to a 
misallocation of resources for society, and it does not mean that society gets 
the benefit of production from both the OCS and the cancelled portion of 
the forty acres if the lessee chooses, or is forced, to give up part of the 
                                                                                                                 
 106. The new rules under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (Pub. L. No. 94-163) 
are found at 41 Fed. Reg. 4931 (Feb. 3, 1976). Additional rules with production incentives 
are to follow shortly. 
 107. Remarks of Secretary Morton in Hearings on Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas 
Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law of the House 
Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. No. 93-31 at 4 (1974). 
 108. Id. at 6. See also, Energy Under the Oceans 225–226, 316 (1973). 
 109. See Oil & Gas J., April 7,1975, at 64. 
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lease. No, the lessor is free to engage in speculation of his own by seeking 
another lessee who will pay a high bonus and high delay rentals for a 
substantially explored leasehold, and production may be further delayed for 
years. The fact that a court can cancel a portion of a lease for failure to 
develop does not mean the cancellation will be followed by development. 
A similar line of reasoning can apply to the implied covenant to market 
gas. If a Texas lessee decides it is more prudent to sell gas into the interstate 
market on a long-term contract to keep North Carolina’s textile mills in 
operation rather than to sell it in the Texas market for a higher short-term 
price for boiler fuel use, the decision may be reasonable and prudent. The 
lessee’s decision may well represent the most beneficial use of the gas, and 
it may help forestall a congressional drive to control the price of all natural 
gas.110 To allow the lessors to challenge successfully good faith business 
judgments of this sort forces lessees to weigh lessors’ interests more 
heavily than the public interest. 
Price controls should have significance for implied covenant questions in 
another way. For several years now there has been uncertainty over 
precisely how some phases of the controls have operated. Lessees have had 
difficulty in determining to what “property” they applied,111 whether a new 
well would result in “new oil” or simply raise a declining production level 
back to its base figure,112 whether a property or a particular operation 
qualified for a special exemption113 and so forth. These controls, with 
frequent changes, will be around for another thirty-eight months at a bare 
minimum. Price on production can go up or down on new or old oil in the 
exercise of executive or legislative discretion. With regulatory and market 
conditions so volatile, something more should be required of a lessor in an 
implied covenant case than a witness with an educated guess that a 
particular well will be or would have been profitable. A matter of honest 
dispute should be decided in favor of the lessee. 
A lessee should also be able to exercise considerable discretion if 
environmental factors are present in an implied covenant case. Many acts, 
rules, and regulations for environmental protection have flowed from state 
and federal legislative and administrative bodies in recent years, far too 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Id., Feb. 24, 1975, at 46; Energy Users Report, Jan. 22, 1976, A-23-24. 
 111. 10 C.F.R. § 212.72 (“Property”) (“New Crude Oil”); FEA Ruling 1975-15. 
 112. Ibid. 
 113. E.g., Shar-Alan Oil Co., 2 F.E.A. ¶ 83,023 (Jan. 21, 1975); Empire Drilling Co., 2 
F.E.A. ¶ 83,142 (May 9, 1975). 
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many to enumerate here.114 Will these have only a force majeure 
significance for implied covenant cases as did conservation legislation, or 
will they be regarded as establishing a new ethic that should be recognized 
when the lessee raises environmental concerns as a reason for not 
undertaking a particular operation? What, for example, if a lessee decides 
not to dig salt water and mud pits, lay plank roads, bring in power 
equipment, and drill in a portion of a large lease near a pristine lake or 
where an endangered species lives for a portion of the year? Later 
technological innovation may reduce the impact of development on the 
environment, and the lessee decides to await such innovation. The decision 
is prudent even though there is no express prohibition on development, for 
development could invite suits under novel theories from environmentalists 
and encourage still more restrictive land use planning and environmental 
legislation. It should be remembered that the lessor may not own the 
surface, and the surface owner as well as the lessee may oppose further 
development.115 Under such circumstances, the question raised is whether 
the lessee has a duty to pollute or disturb the environment until positively 
prohibited from doing so by governmental authority? If lessees cannot 
exercise discretion in such matters, further regulation will be forced upon 
them, and, indeed, lessors as a class are likely to suffer with them. As one 
industry critic has stated, “Unless industry takes the initiative in self-
imposed environmental control, government will impose increasingly upon 
the free enterprise system by environmental regulations.”116 
Conclusion 
Current legal notions of the prudent operator must expand to take 
economic and social factors into consideration in addition to the 
profitability criterion. It would not be going too far to suggest that the 
existence of the petroleum industry as we know it today depends upon the 
                                                                                                                 
 114. E.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151 et seq.; Coastal Zone 
Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451 et seq.; Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300 (f-j 
9); Energy Users Report, Oct. 9, 1975, A-l. See also, Ashworth and Calhoun, “Control of Oil 
Production Pollution,” 48 Texas L. Rev. 1086 (1970). A case in which environmental 
regulation had an effect on the lessee’s implied covenant obligation is Feland v. Placid Oil 
Co., 171 N.W.2d 829, 34 O. & G.R. 416 (N.D. 1969). 
 115. The extent to which the interests of the lessor and surface owner may be opposed is 
well illustrated in Sun Oil v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 42 O. & G.R. 256 (Tex. 1972). 
 116. Victor Yannacone, Jr., 4 Environment Reporter 9 (May 4, 1973), quoted in 
Friedman, “The Operational Impact of NEPA and Related Environmental Laws, 
Regulations, and Orders on Mineral Operations,” 19 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 47, 79 (1974). 
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exercise of sound discretion by industry on numerous difficult policy 
matters. The exercise of that discretion should not be hindered by excessive 
and unwarranted attention to the short-term profit interests of lessors. If 
industry cannot respond intelligently to changing economic and political 
developments and consider the long-term as well as short-run profitability, 
the government will increasingly take over the lessee’s functions. Judging 
from past experience, it is most doubtful that government will better serve 
the interest of the lessor than do today’s operators. 
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